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 pleadings (all available online)-will undoubtedly invite scholarly analysis and serve to guide
 judges, counsel, legal advisers, and other practitioners in the application and implemen-
 tation of the LOS Convention as a part of the global system of peace and security in the
 decades to come.
 BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA
 Netherlands Institute for the Law ofthe Sea
 International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy to commit genocide- complicity in
 genocide-mens rea-judicial notice.
 PROSECUTOR V. KAREMERA, NGIRUMPATSE, & NZIRORERA. Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C). Deci-
 sion on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice. At <http://www.ictr.org>.
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Appeals Chamber, June 16, 2006.
 In an interlocutory appeal in Prosecutor v. Karemera, the appeals chamber of the Interna-
 tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) held that the commission of genocide against
 the Tutsis in 1994 is a "fact of common knowledge" of which trial chambers must take judicial
 notice (Appeals Decision, paras. 35, 38). The decision represents a significant reversal in ICTR
 practice: although some trial chambers have been willing to take notice of "widespread and sys-
 tematic attacks" against Tutsis in Rwanda,2 they have uniformly insisted that the question of
 whether the attacks amounted to genocide is so fundamental that formal proof is required.3
 As noted in the indictment,4 Edouard Karemera and Jospeh Nzirorera were minister-level
 officials in the Rwanda' interim government (Indictment, paras. 1, 3) and served, along with
 Mathieu Ngirumpatse, as the national executive leadership of the National Republican Move-
 ment for Democracy and Development (MRND) (id., para. 9). They are charged with, inter
 alia, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, geno-
 cide, and-alternatively- complicity in genocide (id.). The prosecution alleges that they cre-
 ated, recruited, and organized the Interahamwe, the vicious youth wing of the MRND; pro-
 vided members of the Interahamwe with weapons and military training; and helped formulate
 and implement policies of the interim government of April 8, 1994, that were intended to
 incite, encourage, and abet killings of Tutsis (id., para. 14).
 Prior to trial, which began on September 19, 2005, the prosecution requested that the trial
 chamber take judicial notice of six "facts of common knowledge" (Appeals Decision, para. 2).
 Fact 6 stated that "[b]etween 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994, there was a genocide in Rwanda
 against the Tutsi ethnic group" (Indictment, para. 33). According to Rule 94(A) of the ICTR
 1 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of
 Decision on Judicial Notice, para. 38 (June 16, 2006) [hereinafter Karemera Appeals Decision]. The cases, basic
 legal texts, press releases, and other materials of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda are available at
 <http://www.ictr.org>.
 2 See, e.g.,. Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-I, Decision on Prosecutor's Motion forJudicial Notice
 and Presumptions of Facts Pursuant to Rules 94 and 54, para. 29 (Nov. 3, 2000). But see Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli,
 Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 19 (Dec. 1, 2003).
 3 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Semanza, para. 36.
 4Amended Indictment, paras. 1, 3 (Feb. 23, 2005), Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No ICTR-98-44-I.
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 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, "A Trial Chamber shall not require proof of facts of common
 knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof."5
 Without addressing the issue of whether Fact 6 was common knowledge, the trial chamber
 denied the prosecution's request. First, it held that Fact 6 was irrelevant because the existence
 of a nationwide campaign of genocide in Rwanda was "not a fact to be proved" in any of the
 charges against the defendants.6 Second, it held that, because the prosecution alleged that the
 defendants were responsible for crimes that occurred throughout Rwanda, taking judicial
 notice of Fact 6 would reduce the prosecution's burden of proof in the case.7
 On interlocutory appeal by the prosecution, the appeals chamber held that the trial chamber
 erred in refusing to take judicial notice of Fact 6 under Rule 94(A) (Appeals Decision, para.
 38). After noting that a fact qualifies as common knowledge if it is "not reasonably subject to
 dispute" (id., para 22),8 it concluded that the occurrence of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is such
 a fact, given the "countless books, scholarly articles, media reports, U.N. reports and resolu-
 tions, national court decisions, and government and [nongovernmental organization] reports"
 that have documented the atrocities (id., para 35, footnotes omitted). In reaching that con-
 clusion, the appeals chamber rejected the defendants' argument that Rule 94(A) does not allow
 a trial chamber to take judicial notice of facts that are legal in nature (id., para. 37); it noted
 that the term "genocide" is no different than other legal terms used to characterize factual sit-
 uations-such as "widespread or systematic"-whose judicial notice it had previously
 approved (id.). Rule 94(A), in the appeals chamber's view, asks only whether the fact in ques-
 tion can be reasonably disputed; whether it is described in "legal or laymen's terms" is of no
 concern (id., para. 29).
 Having established that Fact 6 qualified for judicial notice under Rule 94(A), the appeals
 chamber then rejected both of the trial chamber's rationales for refusing to take notice of it,
 which it described as "oddly contradictory" (Appeals Decision, para. 36). The relevance ratio-
 nale, the appeals chamber held, could be "readily dismissed" (id.):
 Whether genocide occurred in Rwanda is of obvious relevance to the Prosecution's case;
 it is a necessary, although not sufficient, part of that case. Plainly, in order to convict an
 individual of genocide a Trial Chamber must collect evidence of that individual's acts and
 intent. But the fact of the nationwide campaign is relevant; it provides the context for
 understanding the individual's actions. (Id.)
 The appeals chamber was no more convinced by the trial chamber's burden of proof ratio-
 nale. In its view, taking judicial notice of a nationwide campaign of genocide in Rwanda will
 not lessen the prosecution's burden of proof in the case. "Rather, it provides an alternative way
 that that burden can be satisfied, obviating the necessity to introduce evidence documenting
 what is already common knowledge" (Appeals Decision, para. 37). The prosecution must still
 5 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as amended, UN Doc. ITR/
 3/Rev. 11, Rule 94(A) (2001).
 6 See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No ICTR-98-44-R94, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Judicial Notice,
 para. 7 (Nov. 9, 2005).
 7 Id., para. 7.
 8 Citing Prosecutor v. Semanza, para. 194.
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 "introduce evidence demonstrating that the specific events alleged in the Indictment consti-
 tuted genocide and that the conduct and mental state of the Accused specifically make them
 culpable for genocide" (id.).
 The Office of the Prosecutor hailed Karemera as a "landmark decision" that will "silence the
 'rejectionist' camp which has been disputing the occurrence of genocide" in Rwanda.9
 Whether that prediction will prove true remains to be seen. Nevertheless, there is no question
 that Rwandans have welcomed the ICTR's formal-if belated-recognition that the 1994
 atrocities represented a nationwide campaign of genocide, not simply a series of individual
 genocidal acts.10
 From the standpoint of substantive international criminal law, however, the Karemera deci-
 sion is troubling. To begin with, the appeals chamber provides only the most cursory expla-
 nation of why the existence of a nationwide campaign of genocide is relevant to the defendants'
 responsibility for specific genocidal acts. The appeals chamber's relevance argument involves
 two interrelated claims: that proof of a nationwide campaign is "a necessary, although not suf-
 ficient, part" of the prosecution's case; and that such proof "provides the context for under-
 standing the individual's actions." Neither claim is persuasive.
 The first claim, if taken literally, is simply incorrect: regardless of whether a defendant is
 accused ofgenocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide, the occurrence
 of a nationwide genocidal campaign is not a necessary element of the crime." Consider, for
 example, a defendant charged with direct participation in genocide. Proofofsuch participation
 involves three elements: (1) the defendant committed the actus reus of the crime, such as killing
 or causing serious bodily harm; (2) the victims of the crime were members of a national, eth-
 nical, racial, or religious group; and (3) the defendant acted with the necessary mens rea-the
 specific intent to destroy the national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such.12 The exis-
 tence of a nationwide campaign of genocide does not "tend to prove" any of those elements,
 as Rule 89(C)'s relevance test requires. The fact that individuals were killed on a nationwide
 scale does not make it more likely that the defendant killed one of them. The fact that the vic-
 tims of the nationwide killings were members of a protected group does not make it more likely
 that the defendant's alleged victims were also members of that group. And the fact that other
 unnamed individuals specifically intended to destroy a protected group does not make it more
 likely that the defendant harbored the same specific intent.13
 ' ICTR Press Release ICTR/INFO-9-2-481.EN, ICTR Takes Judicial Notice of Genocide in Rwanda (June 20,
 2006).
 10 See Felly Kimenyi, "ICTR Finally Recognizes 1994 Rwanda Genocide," NEW TIMES (June 22, 2006), at
 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2006/0622recognizes.htm>.
 11 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krsti', Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 223 (Apr. 19, 2004) ("The offence of
 genocide, as defined in the Statute ... ,does not require proof that the perpetrator of genocide participated in a
 widespread and systematic attack against civilian population.").
 12 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC Res. 955, annex, Art. 2 (Nov. 8, 1994),
 33 ILM 1602 (1994).
 13 See JOHN QUIGLEY, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS 118 (2006)
 ("Even though others may have been acting to destroy a given group, the specific accused person may have been
 acting outside that context, pursuing wholly different objectives.").
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 The irrelevance of the nationwide campaign is most evident with respect to direct partic-
 ipation in genocide, which does not formally require proof of the actions of others;'4 as the trial
 chamber held in Kayishema, a lone individual can theoretically commit genocide." The result
 is the same, however, for indirect forms of participation that necessarily require the prosecution
 to prove the actions of at least one person other than the defendant, such as conspiracy to com-
 mit genocide, complicity, or superior responsibility. An individual cannot be convicted of aid-
 ing and abetting genocide, for example, unless someone has committed a predicate genocidal
 act.16 Even here, however, the existence of the nationwide campaign of genocide is irrelevant
 to the defendant's criminal responsibility: although the principal perpetrator does not have to
 be specified by name,17 the prosecution must still identify and prove the particular genocidal
 acts that the defendant allegedly aided and abetted. As the trial chamber said in Prosecutor v.
 Ntagerura:
 The Chamber emphasises ... that the accused must be informed not only of his own
 alleged conduct giving rise to criminal responsibility but also of the acts and crimes of his
 alleged... accomplices. Thus, pleading accomplice... responsibility does not obviate
 the Prosecution's obligation to particularise the underlying criminal events for which it
 seeks to hold the accused responsible ....'8
 Judicial notice of the nationwide campaign of genocide in Rwanda is not an adequate substi-
 tute for such particularization; a defendant cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a nation-
 wide campaign. To satisfy Rule 89(C)'s relevance requirement, a trial chamber would have to
 take judicial notice of a far more specific genocidal campaign-such as the mass killings in Bis-
 esero, an area of Rwanda that spanned the Gishyita and Gisovu communes9"-that Gerard
 Ntakirutimana aided and abetted.20 Not even Karemera, however, suggests that subnational
 genocides are "facts of common knowledge" within the meaning of Rule 94(A).21
 In most aiding and abetting cases, of course, the prosecution will have particularized evi-
 dence of the "acts and crimes" of the defendant's accomplices. In such cases, of which Karemera
 itself is an example (Indictment, paras. 62-66), judicial notice of the nationwide campaign of
 genocide would supplement, not replace, that evidence. But then the nationwide campaign
 would have no probative value: the fact that unnamed individuals committed genocide
 throughout Rwanda would not "tend to prove" that the defendant aided and abetted the spe-
 cific genocidal acts identified in the indictment.
 We are left, then, with the appeals chamber's second claim: that the nationwide campaign
 of genocide is relevant because it provides a "context" for understanding the defendant's alleg-
 edly genocidal actions (Appeals Decision, para. 36). Like trial chambers that have made similar
 14 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreski', Case No. IT-95-16-A, Judgment, para. 89 (Oct. 23, 2001).
 15 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), para. 84 (June 1, 2001).
 16 See Prosecutor v. Blagojevik, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 638 (Jan. 17, 2005).
 17 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krsti6, para. 143.
 18 Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, Judgment, para. 35 (Feb. 24, 2005).
 19 Amended Indictment [Bisesero] (July 7, 1998), para. 4.11, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case Nos. ICTR-
 96-10 & ICTR-96-17.
 20 Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A, Judgment, para. 509 (Dec. 13, 2004).
 21 There is no reason to believe, however, that the appeals chamber would not hold exactly that in the right sit-
 uation. A number of more specific genocides in Rwanda seem equally indisputable, such as the notorious atrocities
 committed in the Taba commune. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 167-71.
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 pronouncements,22 the appeals chamber never explains what that bare assertion actually
 means. The most obvious interpretation is also the least acceptable-namely, that the existence
 of the nationwide campaign counsels skepticism toward defendants' claims that they did not
 commit genocide. That argument is fundamentally inconsistent with the presumption of
 innocence23 because it assumes ex ante that a defendant charged with genocide in a climate of
 genocidal acts is more likely to be guilty than a defendant charged with the same crime in a
 climate that is not genocidal.
 Another possible interpretation of the appeals chamber's "context" claim is that indirect
 forms of participation in genocide should be taken especially seriously because the existence of
 a nationwide campaign of genocide demonstrates that there are a significant number of geno-
 cidal acts for which the defendant could be responsible. Although that idea has some intuitive
 appeal, it does not suffice to make the nationwide campaign relevant. For the reasons explained
 above, the prosecution is still obligated to identify and prove the specific genocidal acts at issue
 in the defendant's case.
 Neither of the appeals chamber's claims regarding the relevance of the nationwide cam-
 paign, then, is ultimately convincing. Moreover, even if we assume that the nationwide cam-
 paign is somehow relevant, the probative value of the campaign as "context" is almost certainly
 outweighed by its possibility of prejudice, an independent ground for its exclusion.24 As the
 appeals chamber recognizes, taking judicial notice of the nationwide campaign of genocide
 does not affect the prosecution's obligation to prove that the defendant acted with the specific
 intent necessary for the crime (Appeals Decision, para. 37). The problem with Karemera, how-
 ever, is that the trial chamber held in Akayesu-a holding consistently cited with approval by
 the ICTR25-that the defendant's specific intent can be inferredfrom the actions ofothers: "The
 Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act
 charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically
 directed against the same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or
 by others."26 Such an inference may be warranted in conspiracy cases, where the fact that the
 defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the defendant
 also acted with that intent.27 But Akayesu is not limited to such cases; on the contrary, the deci-
 sion says that the defendant's specific intent can be inferred from proof of the nationwide geno-
 cidal campaign itself.28 Although that inference is questionable,29 at least Akayesu required the
 22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, para. 273 (noting, without explanation, that the nationwide campaign is
 a question "of general importance" in a genocide case).
 23 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 129.
 24 See Prosecutor v. Bagasora, Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93 & ICTR-98-41-AR93.2, Decision on Prosecutor's
 Interlocutory Appeals Regarding Exclusion of Evidence, para. 16 (Dec. 19, 2003).
 25 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 804 (Dec. 1, 2003)
 (approving Akayesu).
 26 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 523.
 27 Prosecutor v. Stakik, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, para. 40 (Mar. 22, 2006) (noting that it is permissible
 to consider "whether the apparent intentions of others . .. could provide indirect evidence of the Appellant's own
 intentions when he agreed with those others to undertake criminal plans" (emphasis added)).
 28 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, para. 730 ("Owing to the very high number of atrocities committed against the Tutsi,
 their widespread nature not only in the commune of Taba, but also throughout Rwanda, ... the Chamber is also
 able to infer, beyond reasonable doubt, the genocidal intent of the accused in the commission of the above-men-
 tioned crimes.").
 29 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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 prosecution to prove that the nationwide campaign actually took place, a process that neces-
 sarily involved evidence of specific genocidal acts committed by specific perpetrators.30 Now,
 because of Karemera, not even that proof is required; the trial chamber will simply assume the
 occurrence of the nationwide campaign. Karemera and Akayesu thus form a potentially lethal
 pair: the prosecution can request that a trial chamber take judicial notice of the nationwide
 campaign of genocide, and it can then argue that the chamber should infer the defendant's spe-
 cific intent from that campaign. If the trial chamber agrees, the prosecution will have "proved"
 the defendant's specific intent without introducing any evidence of that intent at all-an unac-
 ceptably prejudicial result.
 That danger will exist, moreover, regardless of whether a defendant is charged with direct
 or indirect participation in genocide. The prejudicial value of taking judicial notice of the
 nationwide campaign would seem to be at a minimum when a defendant is charged with direct
 participation, because the prosecution will still have to prove that the defendant committed an
 act that satisfies the actus reus of the crime. Karemera can be problematic even here, however,
 if the actus reus does not clearly support an inference of specific intent-a murder, for example,
 that may or may not have been part of the nationwide genocidal campaign. In such an ambig-
 uous situation, judicial notice of the campaign could mean the difference between conviction
 and acquittal.
 A similar-and perhaps even greater- danger will exist when a defendant is charged with
 indirect participation in genocide, such as joint criminal enterprise (JCE). To convict a defen-
 dant ofJCE complicity, the prosecution must prove that (1) there was a common plan to com-
 mit genocide, (2) the defendant participated in the common plan by assisting, encouraging,
 or lending moral support to it, and (3) the defendant intended to further the common plan
 through his actions.31 Karemera will require trial chambers to take judicial notice of the first
 element, in the form of a nationwide "common plan" to commit genocide; the appeals cham-
 ber has already held that "liability for participation in a criminal plan is as wide as the plan itself,
 even if the plan amounts to a 'nation wide government-organized system of cruelty and injus-
 tice.'"32 The only live question will be whether the defendant participated in the nationwide
 common plan with the intent to further it. And that is where Akayesu comes in: if a trial cham-
 ber can infer a defendant's specific intent to commit genocide solely from the existence of a
 nationwide campaign of genocide, it can certainly use even the most ambiguous act of "assis-
 tance, encouragement, or moral support" to infer a defendant's membership in, and support
 for, that campaign. The result would be a highly questionable conviction.
 As this discussion indicates, the appeals chamber's decision in Karemera dramatically
 expands the use of judicial notice in genocide cases. That expansion is unwarranted: although
 the occurrence of a nationwide campaign of genocide in Rwanda may be beyond reasonable
 dispute, judicial notice of that campaign has no place in a trial whose purpose is to establish
 the guilt or innocence of an individual defendant. No matter how important silencing the
 30 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, paras. 112-29 (detailing evidence of the nationwide campaign).
 31 Prosecutor v. Tadik, No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, paras. 227-28 (July 15, 1999).
 32 Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Appli-
 cation of Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, para. 25 (Oct. 22, 2004).
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 "rejectionist" camp may be, it cannot take precedence over the right of every defendant, even
 one accused of the "crime of crimes,"33 to a fair trial.
 KEVIN JON HELLER
 University ofAuckland Faculty ofLaw
 Cooperation with international tribunals- binding orders directed at states and international organiza-
 tions-intelligence information-national security interests-disclosure to defendants-fair trials
 PROSECUTOR V. MILUTINOVIW ET AL., Case No. IT-05-87-AR108bis.2, Decision on Request of the
 United States of America for Review.
 PROSECUTOR V. MILUTINOVIl ET AL., Case No. IT-05-87-AR108bis. 1, Decision on Request of the
 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for Review.
 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, May 12 and May 15,
 2006, respectively.
 In May 2006, the appeals chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
 Yugoslavia (ICTY) granted the requests of the United States (U.S. Review Decision) and the
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO Review Decision) and set aside the trial
 chamber's decision ordering the production of intercepted communications sought by defen-
 dant Dragoljub Ojdani.' The appeals chamber held that Rule 54bis of the ICTY Rules of Pro-
 cedure and Evidence does not require the possessor of intelligence information to produce that
 information when that state or international organization is not its owner or originator and that
 an order under Rule 54bis ("Orders Directed to States for the Production of Documents") will
 not issue when a party refuses a state's cooperative efforts to provide information pursuant to
 Rule 70 ("Matters Not Subject to Disclosure").
 Ojdanik was appointed chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Federal Republic of
 Yugoslavia (FRY) on November 24, 1998. Together with six others2- high-ranking FRY and
 Serbian political, military, and police officials-Ojdanik, who later became FRY defense min-
 ister, is accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise, beginning in October 1998, the
 purpose ofwhich was "the modification of the ethnic balance in Kosovo in order to ensure con-
 tinued Serbian control over the province.'"3 According to the indictment,4 "This purpose was
 to be achieved by criminal means consisting of a widespread or systematic campaign of terror
 33 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, para. 16 (Sept. 4, 1998).
 1 Prosecutor v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-AR1 08bis. 1, Decision on Request of the North Atlantic Treaty
 Organisation for Review (May 15, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter NATO Review Decision]; Prosecutor
 v. Milutinovid, Case No. IT-05-87-AR108bis.2, Decision on Request of the United States of America for Review
 (May 12, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter U.S. Review Decision]. Except as noted, the ICTY materials cited
 in this case report are available on the Tribunal's Web site, <http://www.un.org/icty/>.
 2 Also charged are Milan Milutinovik, Nikola Sainovi', Nebojia Pavkovi', Vladimir Lazarevik, Vlastimir Djord-
 jevi6, and Sreten LukiL.
 3 [Redacted] Third Amended Joinder Indictment, para. 19 (June 21, 2006), Prosecutorv. Milutinovi&, Case No.
 IT-05-87-PT [hereinafter Indictment].
 4 Ojdanie was initially charged in an indictment (Case No. IT-99-37), confirmed on May 24, 1999, that included
 Slobodan Miloievik, Milutinovik, Sainovik, and Vlajko Stojiljkovi&. That indictment was thrice amended-includ-
 ing, in its last iteration, the removal of defendants Miloievik (for trial separately) and Stojiljkovik (who had died)-
 and restyled Prosecutor v. Milutinovil. On motion of the Office of the Prosecutor, granted onJuly 8, 2005, the Milu-
 tinovic case was joined with the case against Pavkovid, Lazarevid, Djordjevik, and LukiC (Case No. IT-03-70). The
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